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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Among the most enduring debates in international trade law is how 
should we understand the legal1 relationship between the multilateral trading 
system, as established by the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and preferential trade agreements (PTAs).2  This debate is generated by a 
fundamental conflict between the WTO’s central legal obligation of non-
discrimination,3 which requires WTO Member states to accord equal 
treatment to the goods and services of other Member states, and PTAs, which 
by definition allow Member states to accord more favorable market access to 
some trading partners while excluding others.  If PTAs “entrench the very 
discrimination that WTO rules seek to eliminate,”4 how should the legal 
relationship between them be understood?  
The tension between the WTO and PTAs has dogged the international 
trading system since its inception in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in 1947 and through its institutional transformation into the 
WTO in 1995.5  The multilateral trading system has always provided 
Member states with the right to form preferential trade agreements—most 
famously in Article XXIV of the GATT.6  But throughout its history, the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 In this paper, we largely put to one side the important economic debates about the 
relationship between multilateral and regional trade.  For important commentary on the 
economic aspects of regionalism, see, e.g., JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950); 
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (1991); Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL 
INTEGRATION (Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993); Paul Krugman, Regionalism 
Versus Multilateralism: Analytical Notes, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
(Jaime de Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993). 
 2 In this paper, we use the term “preferential trade agreements” (PTAs) to refer to treaties 
regulating trade between two or more WTO Member states, including customs unions and free 
trade agreements.  While the WTO uses the term “regional trade agreements” (Regional Trade 
Agreements, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 
2017)), we prefer the term PTAs because many such agreements are not regional in nature, 
and because the term “preferential” highlights the fact that the agreements diverge from MFN.  
But see JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT / WTO: ARTICLE 
XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT, at xx (2002) (adopting RTAs as preferred 
terminology). 
 3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. 1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT] (articulating the so-called “most favored nation” obligation).  
 4 Nicolas J.S. Lockhart & Andrew D. Mitchell, Regional Trade Agreements Under GATT 
1994: An Exception and its Limits, in CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE WTO 217, 219 
(Andrew D. Mitchell ed., 2005).  
 5 For a discussion of the history of the relationship between PTAs and the GATT, see 
MATHIS, supra note 2, at 1–11.cx. 
 6 GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV.  See also General Agreement on Trade in Services art. 
V, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
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legal limits that GATT/WTO law places on the right to form PTAs have 
remained frustratingly opaque.  Member states have generally failed to come 
to any agreement on whether the PTAs notified to the WTO have complied 
with the requirements of Article XXIV.  And while scholars hoped that the 
WTO’s permanent Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) would more 
clearly articulate and enforce the requirements of Article XXIV, they have 
found little guidance in the WTO’s jurisprudence.  In particular, scholars 
have argued that the leading WTO case on the interpretation of Article 
XXIV—the Turkey – Textiles dispute from 1999—leaves many unanswered 
questions regarding the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs.7  
Scholars have argued that the case is “inconclusive,”8 leaving Article XXIV 
“mired in doubt.”9 
In the contemporary moment, the international trading system is facing a 
new range of political developments in favor of establishing preferential 
trading arrangements of very different types.  On the one hand, the slate of 
Megaregional trade agreements currently under negotiation and 
implementation has focused on deep regional integration through regulatory 
cooperation and other types of non-tariff barrier reductions.10  On the other 
hand, President Donald Trump has called for the United States to pursue 
bilateral trade agreements and to renegotiate regional arrangements such as 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to better protect U.S. 
markets by exploiting the United States’ negotiating power and through the 
                                                                                                                   
1B,1869 U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]; Differential and More Favorable Treatment, 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.), at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling Clause]. 
 7 Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS34/R (May 31, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles]; Appellate 
Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter AB Report, Turkey – Textiles]. 
 8 Peter Hilpold, Regional Integration According to Article XXIV GATT – Between Law and 
Politics, 7 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 219, 224 (2003). 
 9 Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 252.  
 10 The current slate of “Megaregionals” and other regional arrangements under negotiation 
(and renegotiation or, in the case of CPTPP, at the ratification stage) includes the 
Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTPP); the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP); the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP); 
the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA); and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).  For more discussion of this new slate of agreements, see the MegaReg project at 
NYU’s Institute for International Law and Justice.  MegaReg, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST., 
http://www.iilj.org/megareg/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).  See also CHAD BOWN, MEGA-
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF THE WTO (Council on Foreign Rel. ed., 
2016); MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CETA, TTIP, AND TISA: NEW ORIENTATIONS 
FOR EU EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Stefan Griller, Walter Obwexer & Erich Vranes 
eds., 2017).  
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use of protectionist legal mechanisms like safeguards.11  These different 
approaches to regionalism bring the enduring problem of how to understand 
the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs to the fore.  
If new PTAs, including both ever-deeper modalities of integration and 
new forms of protectionism, are under negotiation, it is essential to know the 
rules of the game—to understand how WTO law regulates and limits what 
Member states can agree to in PTAs.  This Article seeks to clarify some 
important aspects of the WTO/PTA relationship by exploring a novel 
interpretation of WTO jurisprudence.  In particular, we focus our analysis on 
Turkey – Textiles, the leading case on Article XXIV; although, we also seek 
to highlight other neglected cases that help to define the legal terms of the 
WTO/PTA relationship.  While the WTO’s PTA jurisprudence is often 
thought to have left many questions about the WTO/PTA relationship 
unsettled—including which WTO obligations can be derogated through 
forming PTAs and whether Member states can oust WTO adjudicatory 
jurisdiction through PTAs—we argue that Turkey – Textiles and other 
subsequent jurisprudence offers important legal guidance on when the right 
to form a PTA is consistent with the law of the WTO.  This guidance is 
particularly relevant to the types of PTAs that are currently under 
negotiation. 
In conducting this analysis, we explore the WTO’s jurisprudence through 
a conceptual lens that we have begun to develop in prior writing:12 What we 
have termed a “pluralist” approach to understanding the law of the WTO.  
This approach has several important features.  Our approach resists a 
constitutional or totalizing approach to legal authority under the law of the 
                                                                                                                   
 11 See, e.g., The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, OFF. OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-%20The% 
20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); Geoffrey 
Gertz, What Will Trump’s Embrace of Bilateralism Mean for America’s Trade Partners?, 
BROOKINGS (Feb. 8, 2017),  https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/02/08/w 
hat-will-trumps-embrace-of-bilateralism-mean-for-americas-trade-partners/; Claude Barfield, 
Bilateral Trade Teals a ‘Yuge’ Waste of Time, Resources, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2017),  http:// 
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international/316267-bilateral-trade-deals-a-yuge-waste-of-time-r 
esources; The Trump Administration’s Trade Strategy is Dangerously Outdated, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/217179 98-it-will-be- 
hard-deal-china-today-if-it-were-japan-1980s-trump. 
 12 Robert Howse & Joanna Langille, Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and 
Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Restrictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values, 
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 367 (2012) [hereinafter Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism]; Robert 
Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seals 
Products, 48 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 81 (2015) [hereinafter Howse et al., Pluralism in 
Practice]. 
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WTO.13  We take seriously the idea that WTO law can accommodate 
competing sites of legal authority, including the right of WTO Member states 
to regulate through domestic legislation for reasons that they consider to be 
important (what has been termed the “right to regulate”).14  This focus on 
regulatory autonomy and the need to protect the policy space of WTO 
Members has also led us to argue that a particular conception of 
liberalization is most consistent with the goals and aims of the WTO.  
Instead of liberalization conceived of as deregulation on the one hand or as 
regulatory harmonization on the other, we focus on the non-discriminatory 
aspect of free trade.  Thus, according to our grundnorm, WTO law 
guarantees a certain kind of policy space and seeks to promote a certain kind 
of liberalization.  This perspective also generates the need for the WTO’s 
adjudicatory bodies to be able to take jurisdiction over important questions 
that go to the states’ right to regulate and to the meaning of liberalization.15  
This paper begins to connect this perspective to the regionalism issue—how 
can we conceive of a system in which PTAs are permitted (as an alternative 
and novel source of legal authority and norm generation in their own right) 
without hollowing out the state and its fundamental right to regulate, on the 
one hand, and without eviscerating the WTO’s disciplines that protect 
liberalization conceived as non-discrimination, on the other?  
While this Article will not provide a complete or comprehensive picture 
of the relationship between the multilateral and regional systems, it will 
highlight important aspects of the legal restrictions imposed by WTO law on 
PTAs that are particularly relevant to today’s regulatory context.  Contrary to 
the common perception that WTO jurisprudence is too vague to provide 
much guidance on how PTAs can be rendered compatible with the law of the 
WTO, we argue that in fact there are important indications from WTO case 
law that specify when PTAs are WTO-compliant.  
                                                                                                                   
 13 This can be contrasted with those who argue that the WTO is a constitutional regime.  See, 
e.g., DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
177 (2005); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Why Constitutionalism Now?: Text, Context and the Historical 
Contingency of Ideas, 1 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 191 (2005); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories 
of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
407 (2003); ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1997). 
 14 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and 
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, 
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China – Publications].  Another aspect of this 
conception is seeing GATT Article XX as not an exception/carve out but as an integral 
element of the normative balance in the regime established by WTO law. 
 15 See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance by 
Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9 (2016); Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12. 
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This Article will proceed in four parts. In Part II, we provide a brief 
review of the legal interface between the WTO and PTAs, focusing on 
Article XXIV of the GATT, and outline what are thought to be important 
ambiguities in the WTO/PTA relationship.  Parts III and IV examine 
Turkey – Textiles with fresh eyes.  We provide an overview of the facts and 
the Panel Report in Part III, and in Part IV we explore the Appellate Body’s 
reasons.  We argue that the Appellate Body’s report (particularly when read 
in dialogue with the Panel’s report, and with our pluralist approach in mind) 
actually addresses many of the core ambiguities that scholars have argued 
pervade the WTO/PTA relationship.  These include the meaning of important 
terms within Article XXIV and which GATT obligations can be contracted 
out of through PTAs.  Part IV also addresses an important ambiguity in the 
WTO’s internal separation of powers: Whether the WTO’s adjudicatory 
bodies have the power—vis-à-vis the WTO’s Member states—to determine 
whether the general requirements for a customs union or free trade area are 
met by a proposed PTA.  Part V considers another fundamental ambiguity in 
the relationship between the WTO and PTAs: Competing jurisdiction to 
adjudicate between the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure and those 
developed by PTAs.  
II.  THE WTO/PTA LEGAL RELATIONSHIP: ARTICLE XXIV AND ITS 
AMBIGUITIES 
The legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs is set out in several 
WTO disciplines and agreements including:16 Article XXIV of the GATT, 
which covers trade in goods; the so-called Enabling Clause, which provides 
special and differential treatment for developing countries and which largely 
exempts PTAs between developing countries from the requirements of 
GATT Article XXIV;17 the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 
XXIV, a product of the Uruguay Round;18 Article V of the GATS, which 
covers trade in services;19 and the waiver power granted to the WTO’s 
political organs by Article IX(3) of the WTO Agreement, which authorizes 
                                                                                                                   
 16 There are other relevant provisions that are excluded from this list, such as the TBT 
Agreement and SPS Agreement provisions on bilateral mutual recognition agreements; the 
Agreement on Safeguards; GATS Article V bis, which applies to labor market integration 
agreements; and the Agreement on Rules of Origin, which covers rules of origin in PTAs. 
 17 See Enabling Clause, supra note 6. 
 18 GATS, supra note 6. 
 19 The GATS was a result of the Uruguay Round of negotiations that produced the WTO, 
and it expands WTO disciplines to cover trade in services.  GATS Article V addresses PTAs 
that impact services.  The Article contains four main provisions that largely mirror the 
requirements of GATT Article XXIV.  
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the WTO’s Ministerial Conference to waive WTO legal obligations.20  But 
while these other provisions have played important roles in defining the 
contours of the WTO/PTA legal relationship, GATT Article XXIV has been 
the locus of most scholarly debate and GATT/WTO practice and 
jurisprudence.  This Article will therefore largely focus on how Article 
XXIV constructs the WTO/PTA relationship.21  This Part provides a brief 
overview of Article XXIV and its key ambiguities.  
A.  Article XXIV 
We can begin by considering five key requirements set out in the text of 
Article XXIV.  First, Article XXIV limits the type of PTAs that Member 
states are permitted to establish.  The chapeau of Article XXIV(5) provides 
that the “provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent” Member states from 
forming: (1) customs unions (CUs), (2) free trade areas (FTAs), and (3) 
interim agreements necessary for the formation of a CU or an FTA.22  Article 
XXIV(8) goes on to define what CUs and FTAs are. Both customs unions 
and FTAs require Member states to form a “single customs territory, . . . so 
that duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated 
with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories 
of the union. . . .”  
A second important aspect of Article XXIV is that it sets out the basis on 
which CUs and FTAs are distinguished.  Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii) states that 
customs unions must have a common external tariff and trade policy: Each 
member state of the union must apply “substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce” to trade from countries that are not part of 
the union.  By contrast, FTAs need not meet this requirement, and thus 
parties to an FTA are not obligated to harmonize their external trade policy. 
                                                                                                                   
 20 GATS, supra note 6, art. IX(3).  The most famous use of waiver practice is the Kimberly 
waiver for trade in conflict diamonds.  See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority 
Complex?: What to Make of the Waiver for Conflict Diamonds?, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1177 
(2003).  But wavier practice has also involved exceptions for regional economic integration.  For 
discussion, see Isabel Feichtner, The Waiver Power of the WTO: Opening the WTO for Political 
Debate on the Reconciliation of Competing Interests, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 615 (2009); James 
Harrison, Legal and Political Oversight of WTO Waivers, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 411 (2008). 
 21 We also include a discussion of how competing WTO/PTA jurisdiction works, which is 
not entirely in view of Article XXIV. In future work, we will explore other legal aspects of the 
WTO/PTA relationship, including the Enabling Act, GATS Article V, and waiver practice. 
 22 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV(5), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter Chapeau] (stating, “the provisions of this Agreement shall not 
prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or a 
free-trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area . . .”).  
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However, both CUs and FTAs must comply with a third important aspect 
of Article XXIV: The so-called “internal trade requirement” set out in Article 
XXIV(8)(a)(i) and (b).23  For a CU or an FTA to be WTO-compatible, the 
parties must eliminate duties and “other restrictive regulations of commerce” 
“with respect to substantially all trade” among the parties to the CU or FTA. 
That is, the parties must liberalize their internal trade within the PTA. 
Fourth, CUs and FTAs are also required to comply with the “external 
trade requirement” in Article XXIV:5.  Members are permitted to form 
PTAs, so long as the duties and other regulations (maintained or imposed) on 
the trade of other WTO Member states “shall not on the whole be high or 
more restrictive” than “prior to the formation” of the agreement.24  That is, 
Member states are permitted to form CUs or FTAs so long as their agreement 
does not raise trade barriers to other WTO Member states that are excluded 
from the PTA.  
Fifth, Article XXIV contains a notification requirement: When WTO 
Member states decide to form a PTA, they are expected to notify the 
GATT/WTO.25  The PTA is then to be assessed by the WTO’s Member 
states, acting through an ad hoc Working Party formed to analyze the 
proposed PTA (during the GATT era) or the permanent Committee on 
Regional Trade Agreements (during the WTO era). 
B.  Ambiguities in the WTO/PTA Relationship 
While Article XXIV may seem relatively straightforward when presented 
in these terms, it has been continually criticized as being replete with 
ambiguity.26  These ambiguities have persisted even after several attempts to 
                                                                                                                   
 23 The terms “internal trade requirement” and “external trade requirement” are used 
commonly in the legal literature on this subject.  MITSUO MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 24 (2003).  
 24 Chapeau, supra note 22. 
 25 The timing of the notification is undefined; Article XXIV(7)(a) merely indicates that:  
Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade 
area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or 
area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make 
available to them such information . . . as will enable them to make such 
reports and recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem 
appropriate. 
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(7)(a).  However, the Article implies that advance notification 
is necessary.  See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 349. 
 26 The discussion below does not cover all of the important ambiguities that scholars have 
identified in the WTO/PTA relationship.  Other important issues include Article XXIV’s 
implications for anti-dumping, countervailing duties and safeguards, and rules of origin.  See 
generally Angela T. Gobbi Estrella & Gary N. Horlick, Mandatory Abolition of Anti-dumping, 
Countervailing Duties and Safeguards in Customs Unions and Free Trade Areas Constituted 
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find ways to clarify the requirements of Article XXIV by WTO Member 
states.27 
First, at a fundamental level, Article XXIV does not specify which 
aspects of the GATT treaty to which it is an exception.  That is, it does not 
specify which WTO disciplines can be contracted out of through PTAs.  The 
preamble to Article XXIV(5) states that “the provisions of this Agreement 
shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area 
or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the formation of a 
customs union or of a free-trade area.”  But which “provisions of this 
Agreement” does that allow Member states to exempt themselves from 
through a PTA?28  Clearly some aspects of the MFN requirement of GATT 
Article I are implicated by Article XXIV, as mentioned above, but beyond 
that, which aspects of the GATT are included?29  And does Article XXIV 
provide an exemption for other WTO agreements beyond the GATT, such as 
the TBT and SBS agreements?30  (A tentative answer would be no. As a 
textual matter, “this Agreement” refers clearly to the GATT, and other 
covered agreements have their own provisions that relate to the relationship 
of regional integration to that agreement).31  
                                                                                                                   
Between WTO Members, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 
109 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); José Antonio Rivas, Do Rules of Origin in 
Free Trade Agreements Comply with Article XXIV GATT?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 149 (Lorand Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006); Lockhart & 
Mitchell, supra note 4.  
 27 These have included the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in WTO-INSTITUTIONS AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT (Rudiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Understanding on Article 
XXIV]; General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, WTO 
Doc. WT/L/671 (Dec. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Transparency Mechanism]; and World Trade 
Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 19 December 2015, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/DEC 
(2015) [hereinafter Nairobi Declaration]. 
 28 Mathis has argued that this issue was made more ambiguous by the Panel Report, Turkey 
– Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R (May 31, 
1999) and Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) rulings, which expanded which GATT 
provisions could be exempted through PTAs.  See James H. Mathis, Regional Trade 
Agreements and Domestic Regulation: What Reach for ‘Other Restrictive Regulations of 
Commerce’?, in REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 79 (Lorand 
Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006).  See also Robert Howse, Regulatory Cooperation, 
Regional Trade Agreements, and World Trade Law: Conflict or Complementarity?, 78 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 140 (2015).  
 29 As we will see, the Panel and the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles clearly rejects the 
idea that Article XXIV permits derogation from any GATT obligation.  
 30 See discussion in Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4; Howse, supra note 28.  
 31 See generally Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4; Mathis, supra note 28; Gabrielle 
Marceau & Julian Wyatt, Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade 
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This ambiguity is exacerbated by a larger debate in the literature on the 
WTO: Whether we should conceptualize the WTO as a constitutional 
arrangement from which all (or little) derogation is permissible,32 or whether 
the WTO is better understood as a web of bilateral agreements that Member 
states are permitted to alter at will.33  Since the debate between conceptual 
models of the WTO is often framed in these terms—either as a totalizing 
constitutional approach that strictly limits contracting out, or as a largely 
derogable agreement—it is difficult to conceptualize an appropriate limit on 
which GATT/WTO obligations can be derogated from through Article 
XXIV.  
Second, and relatedly, is the question of whether Member states can 
contract out of the WTO’s dispute settlement procedures by forming 
alternative disputes settlement arrangements under PTAs.  Can Member 
states choose to oust the WTO’s jurisdiction to adjudicate through forum 
selection clauses?  What is the relationship between WTO and PTA dispute 
settlement procedures and remedies?34  Article XXIV does not contemplate 
this issue, and scholars have argued that it has not been satisfactorily 
determined by WTO jurisprudence.35 
A third ambiguity is temporal.  Article XXIV specifies that it applies to 
PTAs at their formation.  But when should we consider a CU or FTA to be 
“formed”?  Are measures added subsequent to the enactment of a PTA 
covered by Article XXIV?36  Many important PTAs (most notably the EU) 
have been frequently amended throughout their existence, and thus an 
important issue is how those subsequent amendments should be addressed 
(both as a substantive and a procedural matter) by the law of the WTO (an 
issue raised by the current NAFTA renegotiations).  Article XXIV provides 
no explicit way of dealing with a subsequent amendment.  
                                                                                                                   
Agreements and the WTO, 1 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 80–81 (2010) (arguing that Turkey –
Textiles holds that any GATT discipline can be exempted through Article XXIV).  
 32 See sources cited supra note 13; Chios Carmody, WTO Obligations as Collective, 17 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 419 (2006). 
 33 Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations 
Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2003). 
 34 See, e.g., Marceau & Wyatt, supra note 31. 
 35 Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Regional Trade 
Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO Do, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 193 (2009); 
Karen J. Alter & Sophie Meunier, Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic 
Banana Trade Dispute, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 362 (2006); Marc L. Busch, Overlapping 
Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 61 INT’L ORG. 
735 (2007); Debra P. Steger, The Jurisdiction of the World Trade Organization, 98 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 142, 143 (2004). 
 36 Lockhart & Mitchell, supra note 4, at 6.  
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Fourth, several key terms in Article XXIV have long been thought to 
elude definition.  To take one important example, scholars have long 
wondered about how to define the phrase “other restrictive regulations of 
commerce” on “substantially all trade” within the internal trade requirement.  
Parties to a PTA must eliminate some trade barriers within their trading bloc, 
but which barriers must be removed?37  Similar language also reoccurs in 
relation to the common external trade policy requirement imposed on CUs, 
whereby the members of the customs union must apply “substantially the 
same duties and other regulations of commerce” to those Member states who 
are not party to the CU; and in the external trade requirement imposed on 
CUs and FTAs, which prohibits raising trade barriers to third parties such as 
that “the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed” by the CU/FTA 
“shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of the duties and regulations commerce applicable” before the 
CU/FTA was formed.38  Since in some sense any difference in the regulatory 
policy of two states creates a restriction on commerce (a point frequently 
made by those who urge regulatory cooperation and integration), it is unclear 
what degree of regulatory harmonization is mandated by the internal trade 
requirement and the common external tariff requirement for a customs union, 
and what degree of similarity to the prior regulatory system is imposed by 
the external trade requirement.39  
Finally, Article XXIV does not specify the internal WTO separation of 
powers regarding PTAs—it does not specify on its face the respective roles 
of the WTO’s judicial and political bodies in assessing compliance with 
Article XXIV.  Through the notification requirement discussed above, it 
appears that the WTO Member states are meant to have a direct role in 
deciding whether PTAs are Article XXIV-compliant.  But what role (if any) 
does this leave for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies in assessing PTAs?40  
This issue is compounded by the failure of the WTO’s Member states to 
act through the ad hoc Working Parties (in the GATT era) or through the 
CRTA (in the WTO era) to evaluate PTAs. During the GATT era, the 
process for analyzing whether proposed PTAs were Article XXIV-complaint 
was an ad hoc Working Party system.  But the Working Parties were largely 
ineffective, as no PTA ever notified to the GATT was judged by a Working 
                                                                                                                   
 37 See Mathis, supra note 28.  
 38 Chapeau, supra note 22, at (a)–(b).  
 39 These questions are particularly relevant in the context of new PTAs where regulatory 
harmonization and other non-tariff barriers are the primary focus of negotiations. 
 40 As discussed below, this issue was clarified by the Understanding on Article XXIV. 
Similarly, the GATS clarifies the role of the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies in assessing PTAs. 
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Party to be in violation of Article XXIV,41 and only four Working Parties 
were ever able to agree on that a PTA satisfied the requirements of Article 
XXIV.42  
Following a call at the Singapore Ministerial Meeting in 1996 for an end 
to the ad hoc Working Party Review system,43 the creation of the WTO 
following the Uruguay Round ushered in a new process for responding to 
PTAs notified to the WTO.  The Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV mandated a Working Party review of every agreement notified 
to the WTO and affirmed the need to clarify and enforce the Article.44  The 
WTO General Council established the permanent Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements (CRTA) composed of all WTO Members to assess the 
compatibility of the RTA with the multilateral rules.   
But while the CRTA has the power to strike down a proposed CU or 
FTA,45 in practice the CRTA has proved no different from the GATT 
Working Parties in its ability to achieve consensus and determine whether 
notified RTAs are WTO compliant, and the 2006 Transparency Mechanism 
essentially phrased out Member review of the legality of PTAs altogether.46  
Given this lack of effectiveness by the political/legislative aspect of the 
WTO, what role remains for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies?  
Ultimately, these ambiguities in the WTO/PTA relationship have led 
many scholars to conclude that Article XXIV is effectively a dead letter.47  
Scholars such as Mavroidis and Pauwelyn routinely dismiss the disciplines 
of Article XXIV as being irrelevant to the relationship between the regional 
and multilateral trading systems.48  This has led to a relative side lining of 
WTO disciplines in recent negotiations of new PTAs, including the emerging 
                                                                                                                   
 41 ROBERTO V. FIORENTINO, LUIS VERDEJA & CHRISTELLE TOQUEBOEUF, DISCUSSION PAPER 
NO. 12 THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: 2006 UPDATE (WTO 
Secretariat ed., 2007). 
 42 BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: FROM GATT TO WTO 219 (1995).  Three of these agreements were 
formed prior to the examination of the EEC (the Treaty of Rome), which established a 
precedent that discouraged agreement on examination; after the Treaty was accepted, almost 
no agreements notified under Article XXIV were determined to have met the GATT legal 
requirements.  JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC 
SYSTEM 4 (1997). 
 43 MATHIS, supra note 2, at 131.  
 44 Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27. 
 45 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 23, at 351. 
 46 Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27. 
 47 HOEKMAN & KOSTECKI, supra note 42, at 219.  
 48 See, e.g., Joose Pauwelyn, Legal Avenues to ‘Multilateralizing Regionalism’: Beyond 
Article XXIV, in MULTILATERALIZING REGIONALISM: CHALLENGES FOR THE GLOBAL TRADING 
SYSTEM 368, 368–69 (Richard Baldwin & Patrick Low eds., 2009) (taking as its starting point 
that Article XXIV is inoperable). 
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Megaregional systems.  For some commentators, the multilateral system is 
thought to be both an ineffective negotiating forum for achieving further 
trade liberalization (as a political matter) and as irrelevant to the type of 
regulatory integration that is currently being pursued at the regional level (as 
a legal matter).49 
III.  TURKEY – TEXTILES—THE DISPUTE AND THE PANEL REPORT  
The first systematic effort of the dispute settlement system to address the 
interaction of PTAs with the WTO legal regime under the provisions of 
GATT Article XXIV took place in the Turkey – Textiles dispute.50  While 
scholars have generally concluded that the case does not fundamentally 
resolve many of the important ambiguities outlined above,51 this Article will 
provide a novel analysis of the case, arguing that in fact it provides important 
guidance on the WTO/PTA relationship that has been confirmed in 
subsequent WTO jurisprudence.  This Part begins to establish this claim by 
outlining the facts of the dispute and by providing an overview of the Panel’s 
reasons.  
A.  Facts 
Turkey – Textiles emerged out of a dispute between India and Turkey 
regarding quantitative restrictions (QRs), or import quotas, that Turkey 
imposed on imports of Indian textiles.52  Turkey was in the process of 
forming a customs union with the European Union (EU), which maintained 
quantitative restrictions on certain products under the relevant provisions of 
the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC)—including 
on imported Indian textiles.  To harmonize its external trade policies with the 
                                                                                                                   
 49 The classic statement to this effect was Larry Summers’ call to pursue trade integration 
through all means necessary, when multilateralism faltered. Lawrence H. Summers, Regionalism 
and the World Trading System, in FED. RESERVE BANK KAN. CITY SYMP.: POL’Y IMPLICATIONS 
OF TRADE AND CURRENCY ZONES (1991). 
 50 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7; AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 
7.  However, the earlier unadopted reports in the Bananas dispute did address this issue to 
some extent.  See MATHIS, supra note 2, ch 5. 
 51 This is not to say that scholars have not taken the case seriously.  The case has been 
subject to extensive analysis, and scholars have attempted to clarify its holdings in various 
ways.  We think that it is appropriate to conclude, though, that Turkey – Textiles is not thought 
to provide sufficient systematic guidance on the relationship between the WTO and PTAs. 
 52 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 1.1. 
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EU, Turkey also imposed quantitative restrictions on imported Indian 
textiles.53  
India challenged Turkey’s import quotas on textiles through the WTO’s 
dispute settlement procedure, arguing that they violated WTO law.  India 
argued that Turkey’s new quotas were a violation of Article XI of the GATT, 
which prohibits quantitative restrictions, and of the ATC.  Turkey responded 
by arguing that Article XXIV of the GATT—and in particular the chapeau in 
Article XXIV(5), which states that nothing in the GATT shall prevent the 
formation of a customs union or free trade area—operated as a carve out for 
measures inconsistent with GATT, when taken in the formation of customs 
union.  On Turkey’s approach, once it was established that certain trade-
restrictive measures pertained to the formation of a customs union, all such 
measures must be entirely exempt from analysis under GATT disciplines.54  
Turkey therefore argued that Article XXIV should be understood as a carve 
out that applies to all GATT disciplines.  
Turkey also addressed the internal WTO separation of powers question 
discussed above: It argued that once the WTO Member states had acquiesced 
to or accepted the formation of a particular custom union on the terms in 
question, measures such as Turkey’s quotas that were incidental to that 
formation were not justiciable by the dispute settlement organs.55  Since the 
WTO’s Member states (and thus its political branch) are tasked with 
considering whether a proposed PTA is compatible with Article XXIV, 
Turkey denied that the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies could also have 
jurisdiction.  
B.  The Panel Report 
The Panel of first instance took a quite different approach to the meaning 
of Article XXIV from the interpretation for which Turkey had argued.  
Citing the Understanding on Article XXIV, the Panel found that it had the 
authority to examine whether measures “arising from” the arrangements 
contemplated by Article XXIV were compatible with WTO rules.56  And 
taking a teleological view of Article XXIV, the Panel interpreted the role of 
Article XXIV as connected to the purpose of facilitating deeper integration 
                                                                                                                   
 53 For a discussion of why the EU was able to impose QRs on India while Turkey was not, 
see AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 1.2.   
 54 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.35–6.36, 9.27, 9.46, 9.88. 
 55 Id. ¶ 6.125. 
 56 Id. ¶ 9.50.  The Panel was more doubtful about its authority to determine whether a 
customs union actually existed in accordance with the definitional criteria in Article XXIV, an 
issue that will be discussed when we come to the Appellate Body ruling in this dispute. 
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and freer trade.57  Compatible with this telos was the notion that Article 
XXIV, in as much as it provides relief from GATT disciplines, does so 
primarily with respect to the MFN non-discrimination obligation, which is, 
fundamentally, what would otherwise prevent freer trade among a subset of 
WTO Members.58  The Panel then proceeded to take the position that any 
deviation from WTO disciplines other than MFN in the formation of a 
customs union must have an explicit basis in the text of Article XXIV (or 
some other GATT exception).59  
One such textual basis for deviating from the legal disciplines of the 
GATT could be in the criteria that Article XXIV states must be met in order 
for a particular regional arrangement to constitute a “customs union.” As 
noted above, Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii) incorporates a common external trade 
policy requirement into the definition of a customs union: CU members must 
ensure that “substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce 
are applied by each of the members of the union to the trade or territories not 
included in the union.”60 Among Turkey’s arguments was that if the 
harmonization of external commercial policies (as required by Article 
XXIV(8)(a)(ii)) was an essential aspect of a customs union, Turkey’s CU 
with the EU would not be possible unless Turkey also introduced import 
quotas.  That is, if Turkey was required to harmonize its external trade policy 
with that of the EU to meet the definition of a CU, it should be allowed to 
impose the same quotas as the EU.  
A difficulty with this argument, however, is that it would also be possible 
to form a Turkey-EU customs union if the EU removed its own quotas, thus 
resulting in harmonization to a more liberal common external commercial 
policy.  To rebut this argument, Turkey relied on a particular interpretation 
of the external trade requirement that, as discussed above, prohibits members 
of a CU or FTA from raising barriers to trade with third parties.  This 
requirement states that: “[T]he duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed [on other WTO Members not part of the customs union] . . . shall 
not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than [the prior] . . . duties and 
regulations of commerce applicable [to WTO Members].”61  Turkey claimed 
that the phrase “on the whole” in this provision allowed them room to 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. ¶¶ 9.98–9.100. 
 58 Id. ¶ 9.98.  That is MFN requires Member states to accord equal treatment to trade in 
goods from all of their trading partners.  Without a specific exception, this obligation would 
prevent Member states from forming PTAs by offering some of their trading partners more 
favorable terms and deeper integration than is available to the Member state’s other trading 
partners.  
 59 Id. ¶ 9.208 (summarizing this conclusion). 
 60 GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii) (the common external tariff requirement). 
 61 Id. art. XXIV(5)(a) (emphasis added) (the external trade requirement). 
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maneuver, so that the new member of a customs union could introduce a 
new, otherwise WTO-incompatible, restriction when harmonizing its trade 
policy with other members of the customs union, as long as overall the new 
duties and regulations of commerce imposed on third parties outside the CU 
were not more restrictive than before.62 
The Panel’s approach to Article XXIV in many respects develops out of 
its rejection of this reading of the external trade requirement.  For the Panel, 
the external trade requirement is an additional discipline or condition on the 
right to form a customs union under the WTO, and does not serve as a 
justification for, or render GATT-compatible any new (otherwise GATT-
prohibited) restriction on trade, whether a tariff or other regulation of 
commerce.63  The explicit textual evidence for the Panel’s reading, which it 
cites, is Article XXIV(6), which requires that if any rate of duty is to be 
increased beyond the MFN bound rate, the tariff renegotiation procedures 
apply and compensatory adjustment must be provided.64  In other words, 
according to the Panel, any new (otherwise GATT-prohibited) restriction 
imposed at the formation of a customs union must be consistent both with the 
requirement that the overall incidence of duties and regulations of commerce 
be no more restrictive, and each restriction must be capable of being 
rendered GATT-compatible through some explicit process or provision.  But, 
with respect to non-tariff measures, such as Turkey’s QRs, Article XXIV is 
silent; no explicit avenue exists for rendering them compatible with the 
GATT.  
But is there then a conflict between the common external trade policy 
requirement for customs unions on the one hand,65 and prohibitions on QRs 
in the GATT on the other,66 such that Turkey would not be able to meet the 
customs union requirements and therefore exercise its general right to form a 
customs union without violating the provisions on QRs in the GATT?  As 
noted, one way of avoiding such a conflict is for the EU to liberalize its 
quotas, which would avoid the need for Turkey to impose its own.  However, 
this would have meant that the EU would be forced to choose between 
exercising specific rights it had under the ATC to impose the quotas and 
exercising the right to form a customs union under the provisions of Article 
XXIV.  
The Panel suggests that such a result is prevented by virtue of the 
language setting out the internal trade requirement in Article XXIV(8)(a)(i). 
                                                                                                                   
 62 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 6.33, 6.57. 
 63 Id. ¶¶ 9.121, 9.122. 
 64 GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(6); Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.127. 
 65 As set out in Article XXIV(8)(a)(ii).  
 66 As set out in Article VI.  
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This provision allows some restrictions between the members of a new 
customs union to remain, because it only requires the members to eliminate 
“substantially all” internal trade barriers—i.e., not all duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce—when forming their customs union.67  
Further, the Panel notes, the internal trade requirement refers explicitly to 
internal QRs as among those measures that do not have to be entirely 
removed.68  Thus, the internal trade requirement does not require the EU and 
Turkey to harmonize its QRs.  The EU can form a customs union with 
Turkey while continuing to exercise its right to impose quotas on imports of 
textiles from third countries.  And the EU can prevent, through restrictions 
internal to the customs union, goods in excess of the quotas entering the EU 
through Turkey, without Turkey having to impose its own new QRs on third 
countries. 
In sum, the Panel’s approach strongly suggests that Article XXIV only 
functions as a broad exception to the MFN obligation of the GATT in order 
to permit preferentiality, but otherwise does not provide flexibility to deviate 
from WTO rules.  The Panel simply was not persuaded that deviation from 
such rules would be necessary in order to form a customs union, given the 
flexibility built in to the definitional criteria for a custom union.  
IV.  THE APPELLATE BODY’S APPROACH TO ARTICLE XXIV 
The Appellate Body reached the same result as the Panel, concluding that 
internal restrictions could be used as a WTO-consistent alternative to QRs in 
order to harmonize the external commercial policy of Turkey and the EU.  
But although the result was the same as the decision reached by the Panel, 
the Appellate Body understood the architecture of Article XXIV quite 
differently in several key respects.  These systematic aspects of the Appellate 
Body’s reasons in Turkey – Textiles have important implications for how we 
understand the legal relationship between the WTO and PTAs. 
A.  The Necessity Test  
First and most importantly, the Appellate Body focused its attention on 
the preamble to Article XXIV(5), which the Appellate Body argued was key 
to understanding the WTO/PTA relationship.  The Appellate Body held that:  
                                                                                                                   
 67 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.150. 
 68 The internal trade requirement exempts “where necessary, those permitted under Articles 
XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX).”  QRs are covered by Article XI. Id. 
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[T]he chapeau of paragraph 5 of Article XXIV is the key 
provision for resolving the issue before us in this appeal . . . the 
chapeau makes it clear that Article XXIV may, under certain 
conditions, justify the adoption of a measure which is 
inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions, and may be 
invoked as a possible ‘defense’ to a finding of inconsistency.69  
By focusing on the chapeau of paragraph 5, the Appellate Body was able 
to articulate the steps or elements in applying the exception to a challenged 
measure—what is known as the “necessity test.”   
As the Appellate Body sets out, the first step in the “necessity test” 
analysis is to consider whether the measure under consideration was 
introduced upon the formation of a customs union.70  This implies both a 
temporal and a substantive dimension: The party invoking Article XXIV as a 
defense must demonstrate that the arrangement “fully meets the requirements 
[for a customs union set out in] sub-paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a)” of Article 
XXIV.71  
Next, the second step is to determine whether the challenged measure is 
GATT-inconsistent “only to the extent” necessary to allow the possibility of 
the formation of a customs union.72  In this second step, according to the 
Appellate Body, it is necessary to deploy the definition of a customs union 
set out in Article XXIV(8): The key question is to whether the challenged 
measure’s deviation from GATT rules is indispensable—i.e., logically 
required—for the PTA under consideration to acquire all the defining 
features of a customs union.  
Third and finally, the Appellate Body set out, the CU must meet the 
external trade requirement: that, with respect to third countries, the “general 
incidence” of duties not be higher than that applied by the individual 
members prior to the customs union, and that the “general incidence” of 
“other regulations of commerce” not be more restrictive.73 
B.  Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and the WTO’s Internal Separation of Powers 
In setting out this three-step necessity test, the Appellate Body’s decision 
differs in an important way from the approach taken by the Panel in Turkey – 
Textiles.  The Panel was uncertain whether it had the jurisdiction to 
                                                                                                                   
 69 AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 43, 45. 
 70 Id. ¶ 45. 
 71 Id. ¶ 58. 
 72 Id. ¶ 46. 
 73 Id. ¶ 54. 
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determine whether the arrangement between the EU and Turkey met all the 
requirements of a customs union; it proceeded, exercising judicial economy, 
on the basis that even if the arrangement did meet those requirements, 
Turkey’s deviation from GATT rules would not be justifiable under Article 
XXIV.74  While this aspect of the Panel ruling was not appealed, and the 
Appellate Body made no direct judgment on whether in fact the EU-Turkey 
arrangement qualified as a customs union, the AB noted that “it may not 
always be possible to determine whether or not applying a measure would 
prevent the formation of a customs union [i.e., step 2 of the necessity test] 
without first determining whether there is a customs union [i.e. step 1 of the 
necessity test].”75 The Appellate Body thus clearly sees the dispute 
settlement organs as having the jurisdictional competence to directly assess 
whether a particular measure meets the requirements of a customs union that 
are set out in Article XXIV.   
In deviating from the Panel and suggesting that the dispute settlement 
organs might have the competence and even the responsibility in certain 
cases to determine whether the general requirements for a customs union or 
free trade area had been fulfilled, the Appellate Body attracted considerable 
controversy.76  GATT practice was understood by many to be that proposed 
PTAs, or those in the process of formation, would be notified to the 
membership, discussed in the relevant Committee, and ultimately voted on 
for its compatibility with Article XXIV.77  
Yet the Appellate Body’s assertion of jurisdiction is consistent with both 
the law and practice of the GATT/WTO.  While Article XXIV establishes 
procedures for notification of new PTAs to the membership, and the 
possibility of the membership making “recommendations” in light of the 
examination of the PTA in the appropriate committee, there is no 
requirement that the membership make an actual determination as to whether 
a PTA is consistent with Article XXIV.  In addition, the committees’ 
consensus-based decision-making practice means that it would be very 
unlikely to have a situation where through “recommendations” the 
Membership makes a negative finding of the inconsistency of a notified PTA 
with Article XXIV, given that the members of the PTA would have to vote 
                                                                                                                   
 74 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.54. 
 75 AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 59.  
 76 Now, however, that the Transparency Mechanism has clarified that the WTO’s judicial 
bodies have this power.  Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27. 
 77 PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 312 (2015). 
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against themselves as part of the consensus.78  This has been born out in 
practice, where the ad hoc Working Parties of the GATT era and the CRTA 
of the WTO era have not been able to come to any consensus on whether 
PTAs comply with the requirements of Article XXIV.79  The Uruguay Round 
Understanding on Article XXIV strongly suggests that the function of 
notification requirements and discussion of new PTAs in the CRTA is now 
understood largely as transparency or information-exchange (rather than 
determining compliance).80  The Understanding gives an explicit role to the 
dispute settlement system with respect to application of Article XXIV, and 
notes the need to develop good economic evidence that allows application of 
the criteria in Article XXIV.81  But it does nothing to enhance any decision-
making authority of the membership, or in particular, the CRTA.  The 2006 
Transparency Mechanism goes even further in the direction of structuring the 
consideration of PTAs in the CRTA as merely an exchange of information.82  
These emerging practices suggest that the Appellate Body was correct to 
assert jurisdiction over PTAs in Turkey – Textiles.  
Indeed, the absence of action by the WTO’s political organs to judge 
compliance with Article XXIV could be considered a kind of subsequent 
state practice, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, Article 31.83  Perhaps this state practice means that the WTO 
treaties have evolved regarding their internal separation of powers on which 
bodies have the jurisdiction to determine whether a PTA complies with 
Article XXIV,84 an interpretation which would affirm the approach taken by 
the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles.  At the same time, the Appellate 
Body’s approach does not negate political control over Article XXIV 
matters, as there remain avenues for states to exercise ultimate political 
control over the requirements of Article XXIV.85  
                                                                                                                   
 78 Petros Mavroidis, If I don’t Do It, Somebody Else Will (Or Won’t): Testing the 
Compliance of Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral Rules, J. WORLD TRADE 
187, 187 (2006). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Transparency Mechanism, supra note 27. 
 83 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT].  
 84 Indeed, perhaps one could make an even stronger version of this argument: Perhaps a 
WTO Member would be estopped from arguing before the dispute settlement organs that a 
PTA does not meet the general requirements of Article XXIV if the Member had not 
previously raised the issue when the PTA is considered by the Committee. 
 85 Article XXIV itself notably provides for the possibility of a waiver, where an 
arrangement is non-conforming, and the general waiver provisions have been invoked in many 
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This approach is also consistent with our “pluralist” interpretation of 
WTO law, which highlights the need for the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies to 
act to decide disputes that establish the boundaries of state authority under 
WTO law.86  While we have argued that the WTO’s disciplines should be 
read in a way that protects states’ right to regulate, this implies jurisdiction 
for the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies over matters that set out the scope 
of states’ policy space and regulatory autonomy—a matter that, as we argue 
below, is implicated by the requirements of Article XXIV.  
C.  The “Formation” of a PTA  
A third important implication of the Appellate Body’s ruling relates to 
what it means to “form” a CU or a FTA.  Recall that an important debate 
regarding Article XXIV is how to understand what it means—both 
temporally and substantively—to form a CU or an FTA.87  While the Panel 
had noted that Article XXIV does not define the “concept” of formation,88 
the Appellate Body emphasizes the importance of understanding what 
“formation” means, because the Article XXIV defense applies only to 
measures introduced at the “formation” of a customs union.89  CUs and FTAs 
are often changed by parties subsequent to their formation; are these changes 
non-justiciable? 
The Appellate Body’s articulation of the necessity test suggests that 
preferential removal of restrictions by members of a customs union 
subsequent to “formation” could not be justified as a departure from MFN 
under Article XXIV, since each departure must be subject to the analysis 
they outline.90  In addition, the fact that their approach allows an arrangement 
to qualify as a customs union where some trade is still not liberalized and 
some commercial policies are still not harmonized suggests that a customs 
union may still be in a process of formation even after it passes the 
definitional threshold. It may therefore be appropriate to view “formation” as 
an ongoing process.  
This approach would be consistent with what both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body agree is the purpose of Article XXIV: to facilitate more 
                                                                                                                   
cases where preferential arrangements (such as the Lome Convention) did not conform either 
to the requirements of Article XXIV (or the Enabling Clause MFN exception). 
 86 Howse, supra note 15; Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12.  
 87 See supra Part II.B. 
 88 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.133. 
 89 AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 46. 
 90 Given the Appellate Body’s emphasis on justiciability and the application of the 
necessity test to any departure. 
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liberalization or deeper integration.91  If a PTA is only subject to scrutiny at 
the initial moment of formation and not on an ongoing basis, this would 
encourage parties to alter the terms of their PTAs after their initial formation, 
in order to adopt new measures that did not comply with the liberalizing 
requirements of Article XXIV.  This approach is also consistent with the 
judiciary’s role under a pluralist conception of WTO law, where the DSM 
must play an important role in ensuring that the law of the WTO pursues a 
certain conception of liberalism—and if that objective could only be pursued 
at the initial formation of an agreement, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies 
would be unable to play this important monitoring role on an ongoing basis. 
D.  “Other Regulations of Commerce”  
In their analysis of Turkey’s import quotas, both the Panel and the 
Appellate Body had no difficulty concluding that QRs constitute “other 
regulations of commerce” that must be harmonized in accordance with the 
common external trade policy requirement for customs unions.  When 
reaching this conclusion, the Panel took an extremely broad approach to 
defining “other regulations of commerce.”  They held that:  
[T]he ordinary meaning of the terms “other regulations of 
commerce” could be understood to include any regulation 
having an impact (such as measures in the fields covered by 
WTO rules, e.g. sanitary and phytosanitary, customs valuation, 
anti-dumping, technical barriers to trade; as well as any other 
trade related domestic regulation, e.g. environmental standards, 
export credit schemes).92  
In responding to the Panel’s finding, the Appellate Body made no explicit 
effort to directly identify the scope of “other regulations of commerce.”  
However, it did cite the Understanding on Article XXIV to the effect that 
“quantification and aggregation of regulations of commerce other than duties 
may be difficult.”93  This statement seems to presuppose that the Appellate 
Body had in mind some definition of “regulations of commerce” other than 
duties, but no explicit definition is to be found, either in Article XXIV itself 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 9.98–9.100; AB Report, Turkey – 
Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 56–57. 
 92 Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 9.121. 
 93 AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶ 54. 
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or in the Understanding.94  Can the Appellate Body’s reference be parsed, in 
order to set out an appropriate account of “other regulations of commerce”? 
We can begin by considering whether the Appellate Body would have 
accepted the Panel’s broad approach.  To assess the normative and practical 
consequences of such a broad and dynamic definition of “other regulations of 
commerce,” we need to look closely at the role of this expression in Article 
XXIV.  It appears three times within the text of the article.  First, the internal 
trade requirement states that in both a customs union and a free trade area, 
“other restrictive regulations of commerce . . . are eliminated with respect to 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories.”95  Secondly, 
the external trade requirement, which also applies to both customs unions 
and free trade areas, provides that “other regulations of commerce” imposed 
on trade with third countries “shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence” prior to the establishment of the 
customs union or FTA.96 And third, the common external trade policy 
requirement for customs unions states that “substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce are applied by each of the members of the 
union” to third countries.97  
One immediately observes that in both the internal and external trade 
requirements, the expression “other regulations of commerce” is used in 
conjunction with the adjective “restrictive.”  This suggests that “other 
regulations of commerce” are measures of which the trade restrictive 
character is readily identifiable, even if, as the Understanding acknowledges, 
they are difficult to quantify or aggregate in some cases.98  These would 
include not only quantitative restrictions, but also various kinds of 
requirements and norms that are clearly and explicitly related to border 
restrictions (such as rules of origin, customs formalities, valuation, etc.).   
Furthermore, the internal trade requirement exempts from the requirement 
of elimination “regulations of commerce” permitted under various 
exceptions in the GATT, and refers in particular to those in Articles XI, XII, 
XIII, XIV, XV and XX.  Articles XI-XV all deal with border restrictions 
that take a form other than tariffs.  Notably there is no reference to “other 
regulations of commerce” permitted under Article III National Treatment,99 
which has exceptions of its own, or even under Articles V and VI, which 
                                                                                                                   
 94 See supra Part II.B.  
 95 GATT, supra note 3, art. XXIV(8)(a)(i), (b) (emphasis added). 
 96 Id. art. XXIV(5) (emphasis added). 
 97 Id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii). 
 98 Understanding on Article XXIV, supra note 27. 
 99 GATT, supra note 3, art. III. 
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deal with dumping and subsidies.100  These textual considerations suggest a 
much narrower scope in the meaning of “other regulations of commerce” 
than the Panel’s broad and dynamic conception of “any regulation having an 
impact on trade.”  
In addition, the normative and practical consequences of the Panel’s 
proposed definition suggest that the text of Article XXIV contains a narrower 
conception of “other regulations of commerce.”  Under the right to regulate 
that the Appellate Body has identified as a central tenet of the WTO 
system,101 WTO Members have a right to maintain regulations having an 
impact on trade, even those that have trade-restrictive aspects, provided that 
they are not unnecessary and/or discriminatory obstacles to trade.102  Few 
countries, if any, and understandably so, would commit to an agenda for 
customs union or FTA negotiations that entails the elimination of 
substantially all regulations that have some restrictive impact on trade.103  To 
the extent that they impose some requirements or standards on traded 
products, essentially all regulations have trade-restrictive effects.  Indeed, no 
actual FTA or customs union, not even the EU, comes close to eliminating 
substantially all regulations that have an element or potential element of 
trade-restrictiveness.  
In addition, we can consider the history of Article XXIV when parsing 
the meaning of “other regulations of commerce.”  The drafters of Article 
XXIV had in mind the kinds of regulations of commerce that it was 
appropriate to eliminate for the sake of free or freer trade, such as protective 
border restrictions.  But they did not contemplate eliminating internal 
regulations, that might be the subject of tighter disciplines in FTAs or 
customs unions (such as best regulatory practices, transparency, or 
cooperation requirements) but which are not to be eliminated because they 
serve essential public policy purposes—even if their trade-restrictiveness is 
to be reduced to that which is unavoidable, perhaps through regulatory 
rapprochement or harmonization.  In light of the purpose of Article XXIV—
the facilitation of freer trade—it would make little sense if Article XXIV 
imposed requirements with respect to internal regulations that are largely 
irreconcilable with almost any country’s notion of its sovereignty, meaning 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. arts. V, VI.  Neither in the Can.-U.S. FTA nor under the NAFTA has the use of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties between the parties been constrained substantively beyond 
the limits in the WTO Agreements. 
 101 See, e.g., China – Publications, supra note 14, ¶ 222. 
 102 As we have argued in prior work.  See Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra 
note 12, at 432; Howse et al., Pluralism in Practice, supra note 12, at 91. 
 103 This point is made by Mathis in interpreting the ORC and ORRC language in Article 
XXIV.  Mathis, supra note 28, at 91. See also Howse, supra note 28, at 142.  
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that the ability of WTO Members to reduce clearly protectionist, restrictive 
border measures through PTAs and in a manner consistent with WTO law 
would be held hostage to a requirement of surrender of regulatory 
sovereignty that, realistically, no state could be expected to accept across-
the-board.  
The Panel’s definition would mean that, in the case of a CU, almost all 
trade-impacting domestic regulations would have to be harmonized.  The 
customs union would have to be able to exercise competence over all areas 
of domestic regulation with an impact or potential impact on trade, powers 
far greater than even those that the EU authorities exercise.  This clearly 
contradicts the conception of pluralism on which, in other work, we have 
argued the WTO legal system is grounded.104  Moreover, in the case of 
customs unions, if one takes the harmonization requirement along with the 
requirement that after the formation of the customs union the general 
incidence of regulations cannot on the whole be higher or more restrictive 
(the external trade requirement), then on the Panel’s definition of “other 
regulations of commerce,” harmonization upward (towards the standards 
maintained by the strictest regulator among the members of the CU) would 
be rendered well-nigh impossible, because ratcheting up regulatory standards 
would almost of necessity result in overall higher or more restrictive 
regulations than prior to the CU.105  
For these reasons, we argue that the Panel’s wide-ranging approach 
would not have been accepted by the Appellate Body if it had directly 
addressed the meaning of “other regulations of commerce.”  Instead, we will 
propose a more limited understanding of the term that is more consistent 
with our pluralist approach. 
E.  Article XXIV and Regulatory Discrimination  
As discussed above in Part II.B, an essential debate about the meaning of 
Article XXIV concerns the extent to which WTO non-discrimination 
obligations be contracted out of through PTAs.  Scholars have often assumed 
that home country regulation or mutual recognition approaches that may 
exist in customs unions or FTAs, where imported products are accepted into 
another Member of the arrangement on the basis that they meet the 
                                                                                                                   
 104 See Howse & Langille, Permitting Pluralism, supra note 12; Howse et al., Pluralism in 
Practice, supra note 12. 
 105 For a discussion of the so-called “California Effect”—the idea that economic integration 
may lead to the ratcheting up of regulatory standards—see Richard Perkins & Eric Neumayer, 
Does the ‘California Effect’ Operate Across Borders?  Trading- and Investing-up in Automobile 
Emission Standards, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 217 (2012). 
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regulatory standards of the Member exporting them, are compatible with 
Article XXIV.106  That is, scholars assume that the MFN exemption that 
enables the elimination of tariffs and other border restrictions such as QRs, 
also applies to preferential regulatory treatment of goods originating in other 
members of the customs union or FTA. In our view, however, the Appellate 
Body Report in Turkey – Textiles calls this assumption into question.  
Contrary to the Panel’s notion that Article XXIV operates as a broad 
exemption from MFN to enable preferentiality in customs unions and FTAs 
(while offering no flexibility to deviate from other WTO obligations), the 
Appellate Body determined instead that the defense or exception in Article 
XXIV operates much like, for example, the Article XX defense or 
exception.107  The party invoking the exception regardless of what WTO 
obligation is involved must show that it is impossible to form a customs 
union or FTA unless the parties can deviate from a particular obligation.108  
The parties must prove in each instance that the deviation from WTO 
obligations is logically necessary to form the customs union or FTA. 
In practice, of course, it would be relatively easy to invoke the exception 
to justify preferential elimination of tariffs and other border measures, given 
Article XXVI’s definition of a CU or FTA.  However, given our 
understanding of the term “other regulations of commerce,” we see it as 
questionable as to whether home country-regulation, mutual recognition 
agreements, or other discriminatory approaches to regulatory standards 
which favor products produced under a regulatory regime within the customs 
union or FTA are logically necessary for the formation of a customs union.109  
One could meet the definition of a customs union or FTA under Article 
XXIV by eliminating internal tariffs and other border restrictions (and in the 
case of a customs union, harmonizing external commercial policies, as 
opposed to other sorts of regulatory policies), without in any way needing to 
create a “regulatory fortress.” 
Furthermore, while allowing departure from MFN to facilitate elimination 
of tariffs and QRs among the members of the customs union or FTA clearly 
serves the purpose the Panel and Appellate Body identify as informing all of 
Article XXIV—which is to promote freer, less restrictive trade—regulatory 
understandings that discriminate against products from third countries do not 
as such make trade freer.  Indeed, giving some kind of preference to products 
produced under the regulatory standards of a member of the customs union 
or FTA arguably has the potential to introduce a new barrier to goods from 
                                                                                                                   
 106 See Howse, supra note 28. 
 107 AB Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 7, ¶¶ 52, 57. 
 108 Id. ¶ 58. 
 109 As required by the necessity test set out by the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles. 
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third countries, a kind of regulatory cartel.  Regulatory discrimination may in 
fact be designed to facilitate the creation of regulatory requirements or 
standards that in effect shut out non-member third countries.  It makes little 
sense, in terms of the avoidance of PTAs resulting in new restrictions of 
trade, to altogether remove such arrangements from examination under the 
MFN discipline.110  
This claim is reinforced by the fact that the SPS and TBT Agreements do 
not provide any kind of carve out or exception from their own MFN 
obligations for PTAs.111  Nor can it reasonably be argued that Article XXIV 
itself is now extended, post-Uruguay Round, to SPS and TBT.  The Uruguay 
Round Understanding on Article XXIV contains no such extension, and the 
WTO Appellate Body has stated that that GATT exceptions do not apply to 
the TBT Agreement.112  In fact, when one examines the provisions of SPS 
and TBT, they seem designed to avoid discriminatory regional arrangements, 
suggesting that mechanisms like mutual recognition agreements should be 
open to all WTO Members who are able to satisfy the objective regulatory 
criteria, and that regulations should be based on standards enacted by 
standardization bodies that are inclusive, open to participation by the 
standardization authorities of all WTO Members.113  
We stress that the implication of our analysis is not that the emphasis on 
regulatory matters in newer PTAs needs to be shut down in order to make 
PTAs compliant with Article XXIV (a highly unrealistic proposition); rather, 
whatever regulatory arrangements exist regionally under PTAs must be open 
to WTO Members who are not in the PTA on non-discriminatory terms, 
provided they and their products conform to the objective criteria in 
question.  
                                                                                                                   
 110 Bernard Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WTO ‘a la carte’ or ‘menu du jour’? Assessing 
the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 319, 324 (2015).  
 111 There is bilateral mutual recognition, but this is not intended to be discriminatory.  
Indeed, TBT and SPS both include articles regarding conformity to international standards, 
which suggests that any regulatory standards must be open for other parties to join and should 
comply with an international/multilateral approach where possible.  See, e.g., Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade arts. 2.4, 2.6, Jan. 1, 1995, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement]. 
 112 See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale 
of Clove Cigarettes, ¶¶ 95–96, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter US – 
Clove Cigarettes]. 
 113 See also on this point, Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R 
(May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Tuna – Dolphin II]; Howse, supra note 28, at 137–51. 
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How MFN can operate to ensure that regulation is non-discriminatory is 
well-illustrated by EEC – Beef.114  In that case, Europe had conditioned 
preferential access for certain beef imports on their quality certification by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).115  Canada brought a 
complaint before a GATT Panel, arguing this stipulation violated the MFN 
provision because it gave advantageous treatment to beef imports from the 
United States, which were in fact the only products certified by the USDA to 
the quality standard in question.116  Canada stated it could provide evidence 
that its beef was of equivalent quality,117 and the Panel found an MFN 
violation to the extent that Canadian beef of equivalent quality was excluded 
by virtue of the arrangement based on USDA certification.118   
The lesson for PTAs is they should be operated like open plurilateral 
agreements dealing with regulatory issues.  In our interpretation of Article 
XXIV, all WTO Members and their products should be able to participate on 
a non-discriminatory basis, provided that objective criteria are satisfied.  
This circumscribed understanding of which aspects of the non-
discrimination obligation can be avoided through the formation of a PTA is 
also in line with our general pluralist approach to interpreting the law of the 
WTO.  As noted above, this approach preserves individual states’ regulatory 
autonomy by not making regulatory coherence or integration a mandatory 
aspect of the formation of a PTA.119  While it permits states to form new 
sources of legal authority through forming PTAs, it also ensures that states 
retain their ability to regulate for reasons that they consider to be important; 
they do not need to pursue regulatory integration to exercise their right to 
form a PTA.  The idea that PTA regulatory regimes should remain open to 
outsiders’ approaches also increases the regulatory options available to states 
who are not party to a PTA.  They do not need to join the PTA to have their 
regulatory approach recognized as equal, allowing them to preserve their 
regulatory autonomy.  Finally, this approach also reduces opportunities for 
group-based protectionism and discriminatory behavior, which is (generally) 
the type of liberalization about which we are concerned.  
                                                                                                                   
 114 Panel Report, European Economic Community – Imports of Beef from Canada, L/5099-
28S/92 (Mar. 10, 1981). 
 115 Id. at 2. 
 116 Id. at 3.  
 117 Id. at 2. 
 118 Id. at 5. 
 119 See supra note 12.  This is particularly important in the context of developing country-
developed country RTAs, given the extraordinary inequality in bargaining power.  
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F.  Affirming the Appellate Body’s Approach: Article XXIV as a Lex 
Specialis or Quasi-Constitutional Norm of the WTO System in Peru – 
Agricultural Products 
After Turkey – Textiles, some commentators speculated that the activation 
by the Appellate Body of Article XXIV as a “hard law” framework for 
disciplining the departure of PTAs from GATT norms would have little 
significance, as WTO Members would still be reluctant to litigate matters 
concerning PTAs in the WTO dispute system.  Many commentators still 
consider Article XXIV to be a dead letter, and in that sense conclude that 
Turkey – Textiles has not altered the institutional context in which Article 
XXIV issues are resolved. 
Given this standard picture of Article XXIV’s legal force, it is worth 
noting that the Appellate Body reinforced the centrality of the Article XXIV 
framework in the subsequent Peru – Agricultural Products case.120  In that 
case, Guatemala challenged a variable pricing mechanism that Peru operated 
for certain agricultural products under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture.121  One of Peru’s responses to this challenge was that in a PTA 
negotiated but not ratified by Guatemala and Peru, there was an explicit 
clause allowing the maintenance of such a variable price mechanism; Peru 
argued that this was a case where, in conformity with Article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a subset of parties to a 
multilateral treaty (here the WTO Agreements) modified the obligations of 
the treaty as applicable between themselves through a PTA.122  While not 
really resolving whether the PTA actually did purport to modify WTO 
obligations, or what should be significance of non-ratification of the PTA, 
the Appellate Body made this broad jurisprudential determination:  
[W]e note that the WTO agreements contain specific 
provisions addressing amendments, waivers, or exceptions for 
regional trade agreements, which prevail over the general 
provisions of the Vienna Convention, such as Article 41.  This 
is particularly true in the case of FTAs considering that Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1994 specifically permits departures from 
certain WTO rules in FTAs.  However, Article XXIV 
conditions such departures on the fulfilment of the rule that the 
                                                                                                                   
 120 See generally Appellate Body Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain 
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/AB/R (July 20, 2015) [hereinafter AB Report, 
Peru – Agricultural Products]. 
 121 Id. at 8. 
 122 Id. ¶ 5.85; VCLT, supra note 83, art. 41. 
GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2018 5:44 PM 
678  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:649 
 
 
level of duties and other regulations of commerce, applicable in 
each of the FTA members to the trade of non-FTA members, 
shall not be higher or more restrictive than those applicable 
prior to the formation of the FTA.  
 In the light of the above, we consider that the proper routes 
to assess whether a provision in an FTA that may depart from 
certain WTO rules is nevertheless consistent with the covered 
agreements are the WTO provisions that permit the formation 
of regional trade agreements . . . namely: [Article XXIV, the 
Enabling Clause, and GATS Article V].123 
The Appellate Body is in effect stating here that, even where trade with 
other WTO Members is unaffected, any attempt by two or more Members to 
modify WTO obligations among themselves must pass through the relevant 
WTO legal architecture that deals with changes to obligations, whether 
Article XXIV (for trade in goods), the Enabling Clause (for developing 
country trade), or GATS Article V (for trade in services).  This arguably goes 
beyond the obvious purpose of ensuring that PTAs do not lead to more 
restrictive trade with third countries, or to ensuring that they in general result 
in freer trade, to assuring the unity and integrity of the WTO as a legal 
system.  Preferential elimination of border restrictions is obviously tolerated 
to allow for freer trade, but other departures are subject to a high level of 
scrutiny or perhaps are largely impermissible except by waiver.  Here, the 
Appellate Body adopts an approach to preserve the relative autonomy and 
universality of a multilateral regime under pressure from “spaghetti-bowl” 
fragmentation.124  
V.  FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, CUSTOMS UNIONS, AND JURISDICTION TO 
ADJUDICATE AT THE WTO 
While Article XXIV, as interpreted in Turkey – Textiles and Peru – 
Agricultural Products, is the cornerstone for the legal interface between 
WTO law and PTAs, another jurisprudential edifice on this matter has been 
built up in parallel through disputes in the WTO about how PTAs affect the 
jurisdiction of the WTO’s dispute settlement organs.  The most obvious issue 
                                                                                                                   
 123 AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120, ¶¶ 5.112–5.113 (internal 
citations omitted). 
 124 In Bhagwati’s well-known terminology. 
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arises where a similar or identical claim has been brought in a PTA forum 
and in the WTO: Are such parallel proceedings compatible with the DSU?125   
Since there is considerable overlap in coverage between many FTA and 
WTO provisions and FTAs frequently cite or even incorporate large swaths 
of WTO law,126 a legally and/or factually identical dispute might be brought 
under either or both a FTA or in WTO dispute settlement.  At first glance, 
one might think that the language of DSU Article 23 solves this problem, as 
it states that Members undertake to settle disputes “under the covered 
agreements” in accordance with the DSU.127  But this only grants the WTO’s 
DSM jurisdiction over disputes related to the substance of the covered 
agreements—it does not explicitly state that the WTO’s DSM is 
hierarchically superior to those of FTAs/CUs.  And as a matter of general 
international law, there is no prohibition on parallel proceedings, and 
regional and international tribunals have frequently found themselves 
deciding or opining on what could be considered aspects of the same 
situation or the same legal problem.128  
However, some PTAs have directly addressed this issue by stating that 
where a dispute may be brought either at the WTO or in the regional forum 
that the claimant must choose the latter.129  The question that has arisen in 
the case law has thus been whether such a choice of forum provision is 
consistent with the spirit of Article 23 of the DSU.   
For example, this issue arose in the Tuna – Dolphin II dispute.  In that 
case, Mexico brought a dispute with the U.S. (its NAFTA partner) to the 
WTO, even though the choice of forum clause in the NAFTA indicated that 
environmental disputes (like the claim Mexico was bringing) were to be 
decided in the NAFTA forum.130  The United States raised this issue when 
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was dealing with the request for a WTO 
                                                                                                                   
 125 See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 35; Songling Yang, The Solution for Jurisdictional Conflicts 
Between the WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause, 23 MICH. ST. L. REV. 107 (2014). 
 126 For a recent survey, see Todd Allee, Manfred Elsig & Andrew Lugg, The Ties Between 
the World Trade Organization and Preferential Trade Agreements: A Textual Analysis, 20 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 333 (2017).   
 127 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 3.2, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm [hereinafter DSU]. 
 128 See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS (2003); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a 
Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 959 (2009). 
 129 North American Free Trade Agreement art. 2020, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 
I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
 130 See Tuna – Dolphin II, supra note 113. 
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panel;131 however, a Panel was struck despite the United States’ concern that 
Mexico was in breach of the choice of forum provision in the NAFTA.132   
Crucially, though, the United States did not actually argue before the 
Panel itself that it should refrain from taking jurisdiction.133  This was likely 
because, absent any general doctrine of international law that might be 
applicable to the situation in question, there does not seem to be a strong 
textual basis in the DSU for panels to refuse jurisdiction on the grounds that 
the claim has been brought in violation of the complaining Member’s 
obligations under another international agreement.  
Attempts by defending Members to challenge jurisdiction in these types 
of cases have thus focused on notions such as good faith (which is explicitly 
incorporated into the DSU),134 as well as the concept of estoppel.135  
However, as we explore below, Panels and the Appellate Body have never 
fully accepted any of these arguments—although they have also not 
explicitly concluded that an agreement between two or more WTO Members 
could never be the basis for a panel to decline jurisdiction.  Instead, the 
Panels and the Appellate Body have left open the possibility that there might 
be a valid claim against jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement if the 
parties both accept a clear, unambiguous, binding agreement to opt out of 
WTO dispute settlement.  
A.  Argentina – Poultry  
The first case where the issue of the impact of an FTA or customs union 
on jurisdiction was before a WTO Panel was the Argentina – Poultry 
dispute.136  In that case, Brazil had already challenged the anti-dumping 
measure at issue in proceedings in MERCOSUR.137  Argentina argued that 
the WTO Panel should decline jurisdiction on the grounds that Brazil, given 
its actions in MERCOSUR, should be estopped from bringing a claim 
                                                                                                                   
 131 See Simon Lester, The Tuna-Dolphin Case: The NAFTA WTO Conflict Heats Up, INT’L 
ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Nov. 5, 2009), http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/11/t 
he-tunadolphin-case-the-naftawto-conflict-heats-up.html; Simon Lester, Mexico and the U.S. 
Discuss the NAFTA/WTO Overlap, INT’L ECON. L. & POL’Y BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009), http://wor 
ldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2009/08/mexico-and-the-us-discuss-the-naftawto-overlap. 
html; Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on 
20 April 2009, at 16–17, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M267 (June 26, 2009). 
 132 See Tuna – Dolphin II, supra note 113. 
 133 See id. at 53. 
 134 DSU, supra note 127, art. 3.10. 
 135 See supra notes 126–34 and accompanying text. 
 136 Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, 1727, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS241/R (Apr. 22, 2003) [hereinafter Panel Report, Argentina – Poultry]. 
 137 Id. ¶ 2.19. 
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against the same measure before a WTO Panel.138  Argentina argued that the 
jurisdiction of the WTO Panel should be conditioned on estoppel as a general 
principle of international law (and not that this estoppel principle was 
contained in any particular provision of the text of the DSU itself).139  
Argentina also invoked, in relation to estoppel, the principle of good faith.140  
Brazil countered that, even if the measure was the same, the legal issues 
raised in the WTO proceedings were different from those before the 
MERCOSUR tribunal.141  
Regarding the good faith claim, the Panel followed the reasoning of the 
Appellate Body in the prior Byrd Amendment case, holding that for there to 
be a breach of good faith there would need to be a breach of some provision 
of the covered agreements and something more (e.g., an egregious breach).142  
Given that in Argentina – Poultry, Argentina was not alleging that there was 
any breach of any DSU provision, let alone an egregious breach, this 
argument did not succeed.143 
The Panel’s disposition of the estoppel argument hinged critically upon 
the Protocol of Olivos, a MERCOSUR instrument not yet in force between 
the parties.144  Under the Protocol, a state party is required to make an 
exclusive choice of dispute forum.145  Thus, if MERCOSUR is chosen as the 
forum, the state party would be precluded from bringing proceedings in 
another forum such as the WTO.  The Panel noted that Brazil had not made 
any explicit statement on which Argentina might have relied regarding not 
bringing further proceedings in the WTO.  According to the Panel, the fact 
that the Protocol of Olivos was not yet in force (and that its predecessor 
instrument did not require exclusivity in choice of forum) further 
strengthened the notion that there was no reasonable basis for Argentina to 
rely on Brazil’s MERCOSUR claim as an undertaking not to bring 
proceedings in the WTO.146  
With respect to the estoppel claim, the Panel expressed no explicit view 
as to whether the principle of estoppel could ever be applied to defeat the 
jurisdiction of a WTO Panel.  The Panel simply found that Argentina had not 
met the conditions Argentina itself asserted would have to be present to 
establish an estoppel, including a clear statement or undertaking that induces 
                                                                                                                   
 138 Id. ¶¶ 7.65, 7.67. 
 139 Id. ¶ 7.18. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. ¶ 7.22. 
 142 Id. ¶ 7.35. 
 143 Id. ¶ 7.36. 
 144 Id. ¶ 7.37.  
 145 Id. ¶ 7.38. 
 146 Id. 
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reliance.147  The Panel also rejected Argentina’s argument in the alternative.  
Argentina claimed that should the Panel decide to accept jurisdiction, the 
findings of the MERCOSUR tribunal ought to be considered res judicata, as 
a matter of the application of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, which requires that other relevant rules of international 
law applicable between the parties be taken into account in interpreting the 
treaty in question (here the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement).  The Panel 
noted that, in fact, Argentina had not specified any particular interpretation 
of the Anti-Dumping Agreement that was supported by MERCOSUR law.  
The Panel further observed: “We note we are not even bound to follow 
rulings contained in adopted WTO panel reports, so we see no reason at all 
why we should be bound by the rulings of non-WTO dispute settlement 
bodies.”148  
The Argentina – Poultry Panel Report was not appealed.  However, in a 
subsequent case, EC – Sugar,149 where similar estoppel and good faith 
arguments were raised to claim that the Panel should decline jurisdiction,150 
the Appellate Body held that “to the extent that this concept applies at all, it 
is reasonable for a panel to examine estoppel in the context of determining 
whether a Member has engaged ‘in these procedures in good faith’, as 
required under Article 3.10 of the DSU.”151   In EC – Sugar, the issue had 
nothing to do with proceedings in a different forum; the EC instead was 
asserting an implicit understanding among WTO Members that, despite a 
technical scheduling error, its sugar regime was insulated from challenge in 
WTO dispute settlement.  In response, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s 
findings that on the facts the assertions of estoppel and bad faith by the EU 
could not be sustained; the Appellate Body held that there was simply no 
explicit statement on the basis of which the reliance of the EU on the non-
challenge of these measures could be founded.  Overall, the language of the 
Appellate Body, while not entirely closing the door to estoppel-like 
considerations being relevant to good faith under DSU 3.10, suggested 
considerable skepticism as to whether such an objection to Panel jurisdiction 
would ever prevail.  
                                                                                                                   
 147 Id. ¶ 7.39. 
 148 Id. ¶ 7.41. 
 149 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Export Subsidies on Sugar, 6365, WTO 
Docs. WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (May 19, 2005) [hereinafter AB 
Report, EC – Sugar]. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. ¶ 307. 
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B.  Peru – Agricultural Products 
In Peru – Agricultural Products,152 the arguments about good faith and 
estoppel were again raised in relation to the provision of an FTA, where Peru 
claimed it had been agreed that a price band mechanism could be maintained 
notwithstanding WTO law.  As in the situation with the Protocol of Olivos in 
the Argentina – Poultry dispute, the relevant FTA had not yet entered into 
force.153  As a matter of judicial economy, the Appellate Body might have 
relied on this fact to dismiss Peru’s estoppel and good faith claims, on the 
basis that a commitment in a treaty not yet in force is incapable of setting up 
the requisite reliance interest (even assuming that estoppel could be a basis 
for defeating the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel).  Instead, the Appellate Body 
took the opportunity to elaborate on the approach it had sketched in EC – 
Sugar. 
The Panel in Peru – Agricultural Products had begun from the 
proposition that its terms of reference, which were to make findings or 
rulings with respect to relevant provisions of the covered agreements, 
excluded any consideration of non-WTO international law unless “based on 
a relevant provision of the covered agreements that has been invoked by one 
of the parties to the dispute.”154  Thus, in this instance, the point of departure 
was articles 3.7 and 3.10 of the DSU, and the concept of “good faith.”  While 
relying on the Appellate Body’s approach to good faith in EC – Sugar, the 
Panel also drew from a different Appellate Body decision in the Bananas III 
dispute.155  The question there concerned the status of a negotiated settlement 
of part of the dispute between the litigants, and whether such a negotiated 
settlement precluded further WTO dispute settlement proceedings under 
DSU 21.5.  The Appellate Body held that “the complainants could be 
precluded from initiating Article 21.5 proceedings by means of these 
Understandings only if the parties to these Understandings had, either 
explicitly or by necessary implication, agreed to waive their right to have 
recourse [to WTO dispute settlement].”156  In other words, the Appellate 
Body in Bananas III appeared to provide a clear standard, articulating what 
conditions would have to be met to have an agreement that would effectively 
                                                                                                                   
 152 AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120. 
 153 Id. ¶ 5.119. 
 154 Panel Report, Peru – Additional Duty on Imports of Certain Agricultural Products, 
¶ 7.69, WTO Doc. WT/DS457/R (adopted Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Panel Report, Peru – 
Agricultural Products].  
 155 Id. ¶¶ 7.72–7.73. 
 156 Id. ¶ 7.82. 
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preclude the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel: an explicit or logically necessary 
waiver of WTO jurisdiction.  
As discussed above in Part IV.F, the Appellate Body in Peru – 
Agricultural Products held that the WTO legal system does not allow 
Members to depart from the rights and obligations of the covered 
agreements, except in accordance with the lex specialis of the WTO itself 
concerning such deviations, including above all GATT Article XXIV.157  
But, could two or more Members who sought to do so work around this 
limitation by deviating from WTO rights and obligations through an explicit 
and unambiguous agreement not to enforce those rights and obligations in 
the context of WTO dispute settlement?158  
In Peru – Agricultural Products, the Appellate Body seems to narrow the 
circumstances where an agreement to forbear WTO dispute settlement would 
be effective in defeating the panels’ right to exercise jurisdiction to those 
where the forbearance is in the context of a “solution mutually acceptable to 
the parties” that is “consistent with the covered agreements.”159  The 
implication is that, however clear and unambiguous, ex ante exclusion160 of 
WTO dispute settlement in a regional agreement will not be effective to 
defeat the jurisdiction of a WTO Panel.  Thus, if the facts in the Argentina – 
Poultry dispute had been different, and the Protocol of Olivos had been in 
force, constituting a clear statement of the commitment to an exclusive 
forum, this would still not have been a sufficient basis for an estoppel/good 
faith grounds to defeat the jurisdiction of the WTO Panel.  
The implications of Peru – Agricultural Products are thus significant.  
The Appellate Body’s ruling seems at the same time to constitutionalize 
WTO law as a legal system from which deviations are only permitted by its 
own specialized rules, while also constitutionalizing the dispute settlement 
system by permitting an opt out from the WTO’s judicial jurisdiction only 
where the WTO’s dispute settlement organs determine, through exercising 
their competence-competence, that the “solution” is itself “consistent with 
the covered agreements.”161 
While this approach appears to reinforce the status of the Appellate Body 
as a supreme judicial organ for the interpretation and application of 
                                                                                                                   
 157 AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120. 
 158 See Panel Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 154, ¶ 7.82 (in accordance 
with Bananas III standard). 
 159 AB Report, Peru – Agricultural Products, supra note 120, ¶¶ 5.25–5.26; DSU, supra 
note 127, art. 3.5. 
 160 I.e., prior to a dispute under the DSU. 
 161 See Joanna Langille, Neither Constitution nor Contract: Understanding the WTO by 
Examining the Legal Limits on Contracting out through Regional Trade Agreements, 86 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1482 (2011). 
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international trade law, it also preserves the integrity of the 
political/diplomatic waiver process that provides explicitly for the possibility 
of deviations from WTO norms and indeed the possible exclusion of WTO 
dispute settlement altogether.  Where one or more Members seek to limit 
their WTO rights and obligations, even inter se, they must proceed through 
this political/diplomatic track, which is transparent and entails deliberation 
and negotiation with the entire WTO community. Peru – Agricultural 
Products and Turkey – Textiles are, thus, mutually reinforcing, for in Turkey 
– Textiles the Appellate Body imposes a strict necessity test on any trade 
restrictive deviation from WTO rules in the context of a free trade area or 
customs area.  
What we might call the “constitutionalization” effect of Peru – 
Agricultural Products and Turkey – Textiles, taken together, has an important 
implication in the regionalism context: Side-deals, bilateral or plurilateral, 
cannot be used be adjust liberalization downward from what is legally 
entrenched in the WTO system; such deals cannot be used to retake national 
sovereignty on an ad hoc basis, as it were.  New types of safeguards or trade 
remedies, as proposed in the context of the Trump Administration, for 
example, cannot be enacted through “deals” with individual countries, to the 
extent that they are not WTO-consistent.  The Appellate Body’s 
constitutionalization approach seems to address, at the jurisprudential level, 
the fear that through the proliferation of preferential or regional 
arrangements, the multilateral trading order could unravel into a bowl of 
spaghetti.  These cases ensure that WTO law operates autonomously and in 
full enforceable effect, from anything that might be agreed bilaterally or 
regionally.  
C.  Mexico – Soft Drinks 
The clash of jurisdictions issue also arose in the Mexico – Soft Drinks 
case, a case involving the United States and Mexico that arose out of what 
was initially a NAFTA dispute.162  According to Mexico, the United States 
and Mexico had negotiated an understanding (under NAFTA rules) 
concerning sweeteners in soft drinks, including cane sugar and High-
Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS).  Mexico felt that the United States was in 
breach of this understanding and that it had persistently blocked the 
                                                                                                                   
 162 Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS308/R (Oct. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks]; Appellate Body 
Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks]. 
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formation of a NAFTA dispute panel to resolve the matter—itself a NAFTA 
breach.  In response to these alleged violations of NAFTA, Mexico imposed 
a discriminatory tax on HFCS, favoring domestic producers of cane sugar.  
The United States brought proceedings in the WTO, claiming that the 
discriminatory tax was in violation of GATT Article III:2.163  Mexico argued 
that the Panel should decline jurisdiction to hear the dispute, on the grounds 
that the appropriate and adequate forum was NAFTA, given that the 
underlying dispute concerned the resolution of Mexico’s complaints that the 
United States had violated NAFTA.164 
Mexico’s position was not, however, based on any explicit choice of 
forum clause in NAFTA that might be an impediment to bringing 
proceedings at the WTO.165  Instead, Mexico maintained that the Panel 
should exercise its inherent discretion under the DSU to refuse jurisdiction 
where a WTO ruling would not contribute to a “positive solution” of the 
dispute.166 Moreover, Mexico asserted that NAFTA was the more 
appropriate forum, since a NAFTA tribunal would have jurisdiction to 
consider both parts of the claim: Mexico’s arguments about the United 
States’ NAFTA violations and the United States’ argument that the tax 
measures were illegal.167  And in the WTO proceedings, Mexico would have 
no opportunity to pursue its counterclaims against the United States for 
NAFTA violations, since the WTO dispute settlement organs cannot provide 
a remedy for violations of non-WTO law. 
The Panel’s report indicates that, as a general matter, the DSU places it 
under a legal obligation to take jurisdiction over complaints of violations of 
the covered agreements, since the DSU gave Members a right of recourse to 
dispute settlement in cases of an alleged violation of WTO disciplines.168  
Thus, to refuse jurisdiction would be to diminish rights and obligations under 
the DSU, which is prohibited under DSU Article 3.2.  The Panel noted that 
there might be other cases where its jurisdiction is “legally constrained” even 
though there is a valid complaint of violation, and adequate terms of 
reference flowing from that complaint.169  But this was not such a situation.  
(This may have been because in this case, Mexico did not allege bad faith on 
                                                                                                                   
 163 GATT, supra note 3, art. III:2 (the National Treatment obligation); see Panel Report, 
Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 1.2. 
 164 Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 3.2. 
 165 Unlike the United States’ concern about Mexico’s own choice of forum in Tuna II. 
 166 Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 4.154. 
 167 This is because NAFTA essentially incorporates GATT III:2.  
 168 Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 5.13. 
 169 Id. ¶ 7.10. 
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the part of the United States in bringing the proceedings. Instead, its 
argument was better understood as essentially a forum non conviens claim.) 
The Panel also referred to Article 3.10 of the DSU, which states that 
WTO Members should not link “complaints and counter-complaints in 
regard to distinct matters.”170  But the Panel did not consider in any depth 
Mexico’s argument that in fact the matters were not distinct since the 
measures complained of in the WTO were in fact countermeasures in 
response to alleged violations of a different treaty—NAFTA.  The Panel then 
suggested that, in theory, there might be some circumstances where a Panel 
“might be entitled . . . to find that a dispute would more appropriately be 
pursued before another tribunal.”171  But it could not do so by reason of the 
advantage to the claimant of being able to link a different claim or distinct 
counter-claim in the other forum; the Panel suggested if that kind of concern 
could be taken into account there could be a slippery slope where “the 
decision to exercise jurisdiction would become political rather than legal in 
nature.”172 
Mexico appealed the Panel’s decision to exercise jurisdiction.  On appeal, 
the Appellate Body reiterated its position that while there may be some 
inherent discretion that a Panel has to decide the boundaries of its 
jurisdiction, it must operate always in accordance with the provisions of the 
DSU.173  The Appellate Body found no basis in the DSU for the Panel to 
decline jurisdiction in this case, upholding its general reasoning.  However, 
the Appellate Body also stated that it was not ruling on how a Panel might 
decide on jurisdiction if there were an exclusive forum clause that was 
activated under the other treaty or if the underlining dispute had already been 
decided in the other forum.174  
Mexico had also argued that the Appellate Body should follow the clean 
hands doctrine articulated in Chorzow Factory case, which holds that “one 
party cannot avail himself of the fact that the other has not fulfilled some 
obligation, or has not had recourse to some means of redress, if the former 
party has, by some illegal act, prevented the latter from fulfilling the 
obligation in question, or from having recourse to the tribunal which would 
have been open to him.”175  The only reason the Soft Drinks dispute was 
before the WTO, Mexico argued, was because the United States was 
preventing Mexico from accessing “the tribunal which would have been 
                                                                                                                   
 170 Id. ¶ 7.15; DSU, supra note 127, art. 3.10. 
 171 Panel Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162, ¶ 7.17. 
 172 Id. 
 173 AB Report, Mexico – Soft Drinks, supra note 162. 
 174 Id. ¶ 54. 
 175 Id. ¶ 31.  
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open to it” through an illegal act—the United States’ violation of NAFTA 
dispute settlement procedures which prevented a NAFTA claim from being 
brought.176  In response, the Appellate Body held that applying this doctrine 
would require it to make a judgment that NAFTA had been violated, and that 
the WTO dispute settlement system cannot be used “to determine rights and 
obligations outside the covered agreements.”177  
It is this last jurisprudential move that, arguably, has real systemic and 
perhaps constitutional significance for the WTO/PTA relationship.  It 
strongly establishes the autonomy of the WTO dispute settlement system 
from other legal orders, in perhaps, analogously the way that the European 
Court of Justice Grand Chamber established the autonomy of the UN Charter 
legal framework from the European law framework that the Court was 
required to apply.178  The question is whether this autonomy is inconsistent 
with the deep structure of international law.179  
One might also argue, though, that the strong notion of autonomy here 
expressed by the Appellate Body also protects the WTO system itself from 
the consequences of regional trade forums making their own determinations 
that WTO norms have been violated—which Members of the WTO are 
prohibited from allowing under Article 23 of the DSU.180  In other words, the 
WTO’s holding in Soft Drinks may imply a sort of comity, where the WTO 
neither countenances determinations of its own rules and obligations by other 
fora nor accepts jurisdiction to determine rights and obligations under those 
agreements, not even for the purpose of resolving any possible policy or legal 
conflict arising from the joint applicability in the respective fora of the rights 
and obligations of each legal system.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Recent developments in the politics of international trade have once again 
brought debates over the legal relationship between regionalism and 
multilateralism to the fore.  In light of these developments and the scholarly 
consensus that the WTO’s jurisprudence has provided insufficient guidance 
                                                                                                                   
 176 Id. ¶ 56.   
 177 Id. 
 178 See Case C–402/05 P and C–415/05, P. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I–6351.  
 179 For example, the notion that jus cogens and the U.N. Charter would prevail over the 
rights and obligations provided by treaty (to the extent of any inconsistency) could only be 
given full effect if the tribunal charged with settling disputes under the treaty were able, in 
order to apply these meta-rules of international law, to determine whether in fact, if the treaty 
were applied, a violation of the Charter or jus cogens would occur. 
 180  DSU, supra note 127, art. 23. 
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on the regionalism/multilateralism relationship, this Article has undertaken a 
reassessment of WTO jurisprudence on regionalism to explore certain key 
aspects of the legal relationship between PTAs and the WTO.   
We argue that there are two key aspects of this legal relationship that can 
be gleaned from WTO case law, which are crucial to determining what types 
of PTAs are WTO-compatible.  First, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies have 
continually asserted their jurisdiction to adjudicate whether PTAs are WTO-
compatible, both vis-à-vis the WTO’s political organs and PTA dispute 
settlement mechanisms.  This approach is evident in the Appellate Body’s 
report in Turkey – Textiles, which made clear that all aspects of Article 
XXIV were justiciable by the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies (and not just 
the WTO’s political bodies), and it was affirmed in the subsequent Peru – 
Agricultural Products case.  And it is evident in the Appellate Body’s 
jurisprudence on competing PTA fora, where in cases like Argentina – 
Poultry, Peru – Agricultural Products, and Mexico – Soft Drinks, the 
Appellate Body has limited the ability of Member states to contract out of the 
WTO’s dispute settlement procedures and asserted the autonomy of the 
WTO’s legal order.  
Second, the WTO’s adjudicatory bodies have strictly limited the extent to 
which states can contract out of the substance of WTO obligations through 
PTAs.  On our reading of Turkey – Textiles, the Appellate Body has held that 
Article XXIV only permits states to derogate from WTO obligations that are 
logically necessary to the formation of a CU or FTA—a standard that does 
not include regulatory discrimination.  And this standard is to be applied by 
the WTO’s dispute settlement bodies not just at the initial moment when a 
PTA is signed and ratified but rather should apply to any subsequent 
amendments to the PTA.  
Ultimately, the approach of the Appellate Body to the interaction of 
preferential trade arrangements, bilateral or regional, with the WTO legal 
system is to reinforce the autonomy, if not a certain kind of supremacy or at 
least primacy, of the WTO legal order, at a time when regional and bilateral 
agreements and negotiations proliferate, partially in response to the supposed 
blockage or failure of the political and diplomatic processes of the WTO.  On 
balance, the Appellate Body makes exit to regional dispute settlement harder 
and certainly shows no interest in treaty interpretations that could 
accommodate or facilitate harmonious co-existence with regional regimes. 
The question now, however, concerns the durability of the Appellate Body as 
a supreme judicial authority for the WTO system.  The United States’ 
blockage of the appointment of new Appellate Body Members, based on a 
critique of the Appellate Body that is far from clear in its emphasis or scope, 
has led to considerable anxiety about the future of the Appellate Body’s role.  
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This subject is beyond the remit of the present Article; however, the 
jurisprudence of the Appellate Body that we have discussed remains as the 
“shadow of the law” in which any political accommodations between the 
WTO system and regional arrangements (such as waivers) will be 
formulated. 
 
